If regulation is to be effective, not only must changes take place in the mode
Introduction
Though the conclusions of many studies that have attempted to measure the effectiveness of occupational health and safety legislation havẽ been a little disappointing to say the lẽast, over time, much has been accomplished. As we have learned how to cope with many of the more obvious hazards, mainly of a broadly physical or mechanical nature, modem technology has brought many new challenges in its wake. For example, who would have envisaged 30 or more years ago, that we would now be concerned with health problems in the ordinary office; previously thought to be, and which mostly was, the most benign of ẽnvironments. Again, until relatively recently the emphasis has almost exclusively been on safety factors and, though much is now changing, one must question whether the r· ecognition of the health hazards of 'the working environment is proceeding fast enough.
In addition to considering developments in other countries and the indications ~or change set out in the more recent conventions of the International Labour Organization, it is also logical to ẽxamine some of the reasons why so many negative attitudes still abound. Why, for example, is there not more enthusiasm for a participative approach or a greater detetanination to deal morẽ effectively with the health hazards of the working ẽnvironment? Our very dilatory approach to the pfoblems of asbestos is glaring evidence of the chronic inertia that has plagued New Zealand for too many years. Many will see
• Teaching Fellow in Safety and ' Occupational Health, Massey University. some hope for improvement in the Occupational Safety and Health Bill but are there roadblocks ahead? Prior to the 1990 General Election National Party spokesman on industrial relations, Bill Birch, is reported as saying: "if the Bill does survive the election, National's changes will make it unrecognisable." (National Business Review, 28 August 1990, p.4) . If we are not to perpetuate the seeming indifference of past authorities to change, then both the need for change and the factors keeping past prejudice alive need to be discussed, better understood and adverse influences countered. That is the objective of this paper.
Recent legislative changes elsewhere
What then are the indications from the more recent developments overseas? Unfortunately, whereas we once led the world in many of our innovative approaches, except for accident compensation, that appears to be no longer the case? It is certainly so with respect to occupational health and safety legislation, for while other countries have taken up the challenge of new approaches, we have lagged behind. That being so, what have we been missing? Since the Robens Report (Safety and health at work, 1972) much emphasis has been placed on the need for self-regulation. , even though that particular aspect of the report has drawn a lot of criticism. Certainly Robens, as with any other report, contains much that can be criticized but are . all those criticisms justified? Surely the points that one can criticize should not be allowed to obscure the indisputable facts that it emphasizes or well-reasoned arguments for change.
There are decided limits to the range of regulation itself, and to its enforcement. Thus appropriately, the principal message from Robens is the need to impress the responsibility of and need for action by "those who create the risks and those who work with them" (Safety and health at work, 1972, p.7). That view then leads quite naturally to a call for a more participative approach, a call that has not met with universal approval, despite its sheer logic . . One could well ask whether the words "self-regulation" lack appeal, are misunderstood and even counter-productive. Interestingly in Canada, Dr James Ham sitting as a Royal Commissioner examining the health and safety of workers in Ontario mines embraced the same principles but expressed himself a little differently using the words: "internal responsibility system" stating:
The acceptable levels of risks at work and in life-style are being redefined by society. It is essential that this process be marked by a higher measure of openness than has hitherto characterized government and industrial policy. Openness, contributive participation by workers, and thorough accountability can re-establish the self-regulatory character of the internal responsibilitysystem at the compan}' level as the key to the control of risks at work in a technologically complex future. Secondly, the committee's input may be more problematic with regard to health issues than with safety issues. Infolnlation problema are severe, for it may be difficult for workers to acquire infCflmalion on cheauic•la or other toxic substances in their work environment, particularly if a trade IWile is used. Certainly the Ministry of Labour study on voluntat)' committees found that "health issues are conspicuous by their near absence, particularly in those industries with recognised health problems" (Gunderson and Swinton. 1981, p.8.21 ).
After suggesting that, even accepting some of the shortcomings outlined, they comment that "the joint committee is, however, an improvement on the situation with no joint committees." And later:
Where management is cooperative with the joint committee, the joint committee cm have a valuable input into control of he•Jth hazarda. This may take the fonn of designing education propuns, discuasina new safety rules and communicating them to w9rkers, or working with manaamnent on the phuing out of the hazard (Gunderson and Swinton, 1981, p.8.22 ).
Unsatisfactory aspects of the past performance of such committees should not be allowed to stultify progress. When one's eye is fu1nly glued to the rear vision mi•Ior of past attitudes, experience and convictions, little will be seen of the road of propess which still lies ahead. Many managements are still very reluctant to see peater worker involvement in occupational health and safety or any participation by the workforce in trade union education. If prog~ess is to be made such views need to be countered. On the other hand, others would maintain that more trade union involvement in occupational health and safety is long overdue, though unions themselves are stepping up their own educational programmes.
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Causation
It is insufficiently recognized that accidental injury and work-related disease seldom occurs as the result of one factor alone, for most injuries arise as a result of several factors some of which may be completely unrelated. Then there could be differences in injury reporting, not forgetting that each does not have the same threshold of pain. Much of this misunderstanding stems from inadequate investigation of accidents and their causation. For too long attention has been focussed on unsafe acts and conditions and the hasty determination of a single cause. Often inquiry has concentrated on the obvious, ignoring the real underlying causation and, sometimes, emotional factors may play too large a part in a detennination. Thus with good reason have some writers expounded on the myth of the careless worker. Today, for example, among other developments, ergonomics is giving us a greater insight into causation.
Victim blaming
Under this heading, it is suggested, lies another of the reasons why more progress has not been made, especially in harnessing the management system and the participatory approach. Out in the community and in the workplace, there is still a lot of negativism about occupational health and safety which must be counterẽd and overcome if real progress is to be made. Many hold a conviction that numerous accident victims are the authors of their own misfortune. True, often a superficial examination of the circumstances surrounding an accident will suggest that to be the case but one needs to look deeper. The underlying cause of many accidents can only be deteinained by a thorough and objective investigation of all the circumstances.
The accident proneness theory
The accident proneness theory, which stems from studies made among munition workers during World War I, has been responsible for one of the most unprofitable debates in the safety field. What is worse, it has, on occasions, been used to the detriment of genuine preventive measures, often as an excuse for inactivity. One of the more detailed studies, that of Arbous and Kerrich (1951, p.363) , comments that this concentration on personal attributes has resulted in " .... an attempt to shift the blame from the environment to the individual, calling people and not workplaces, accident prone".
These aspects need to be examined and put in their proper perspective. Obviously all people do not have the same degree of perception, coordination and dexterity and thus even in a group of similar individuals, there will be differing degrees of performance. Furtheunore, one's ability to undertake a particular task is not constant and may vary in response to a host of factors including health, personal problems and stress in its many fo1rns, all of which may vary over time.
Much misunderstanding has been caused by the widely differing concepts, that many have concerning accident proneness, a tenn that can be subject to numerous and diverse interpretations. Several factors enter into the argument and clearly the first to consider is causation. It cannot be assumed that an injured person may be ellen partially the author of his or her own misfortune. Even in cases where a person may be plainly guilty of some inattention or disregard of rules, one needs to look further. There may have been some external factors influencing events such as pressure to complete a task, tiredness brought on by long working hours or family problems.
In addition to the very comprehensive paper of Arbous and Kenich, the other major work undertaken in recent years is that by Shaw and Sichel. Their concluding chapter begins somewhat realistically:
It would be very gratifying to be able to end this section of the book by giving clear-cut answers to the two basic questions: "Is accident proneness a myth or a reality? and "If it is a reality, how much does it matter in the accident situation as a whole?" (Shaw and Sichel, 1971, p.416 ).
And finally:
But something which I have also tried to do is to show how research on accident proneness has done rather more than uncover many of the reasons why individual people have accidents. It has shown that one of the potent reasons why accidents happen at all, is that they are encouraged rather than prevented by the prevalent attitude of the community to the whole accident problemespecially in those countries where accident rates are still unnecessarily high (Shaw and Sichel, 1971, p.421 ) .
In like vein, Sass and Cook (1981, p.107) conclude another examination of the various studies that havẽ been undertaken against the background of the typical work situation:
If all this is combined with a dangerous physical work environment or hazardous work processes, then accidents are bound to take place. ' Telling workers not to have accidents is simply not a preventive measure, as accident liability is inherent in the very nature of the work. Blaming the victims for accidents is also fruitless, since it does not provide impetus for the elimination of hazardous · conditions. In this respect, the accident proneness thesis has not been a benign scientific error. Its introduction may have been accompanied by the best of intentions, but its unquestioning acceptance and widespread use have obscured the need for development of a holistic approach toward understanding and preventing industrial accidents in light of the dynamic interaction between the socio-technical work environment and workers.
What appears to be overlooked by those who make much of the proneness theory, even accepting there will be some who are more likely to be injured than others, is their failure to determine to what practical use that knowledge can be put. Can those individuals be identified and restricted to activities where their unfortunate characteristics will no longer be a risk and, if so, upon whom will such decisions fall? In the end perhaps the most disastrous effect of the whole debate is the ẽmphasis it has given to the tendency to blame the victim and not to seek the basic · causation.
The influence of economic cond. itions
Another factor which we have to accept today is the effect of the downturn in the economy, when the whole scene can well change. As Glendon and Booth comment when examining more recent developments in Britain:
Since about 1979, however, there has been a decline in such activity [trade union stimulus] . Incrẽasing worker expectations regarding health and safety generated since the mid-l970s are now coming into conflict with the effects of the economic recession, which operate to reduce expenditure on health and safety and concomitantly increase redundancy fears and channel trade union activity more towards job preservation. Despite increasing worker concern about the work environment, trade unions have greater difficulty in pressing In view of Heinrich's linking of accident frequency with quality 60 years ago. it in interesting to see that now that view is emergiag apia.
Much more needs to be done to emphasize that compliance with regulatory provisions alone, will not ensure the safest or healthiest possible workplace. Regulation needs to be so designed and enforced that attention is first focussed on the management of the organization, its systems and quality controls. In a review of the health and safety legislation administered by the Maritime Division of the New Zealand Ministry of Transport much emphasis was laid on quality control. After refening to the work of Dr
Edwards Deming (1982, p.352) in Japan, immediately following the World War u. where he stressed the importance of statistical methods and quality control the report goes on to stress the relationship between quality and safety commenting:
Why have we been talking about quality when we are supposed to be conce~ned with safety? Because the two are inextricably intertWined, in fact safety is a subset of quality. We can show this axiomatically. Let us take DeminJ's definition of quality -a product or service supplied reliably according to specification -and let the required safety levels be put of the specification.
Then it automatically follows that the product will be a safe product. This principle applies to the manufacture and maintenance of all products with which the Maritime Transport Division is involved, such u boilers, Ufts, cranea, pressure and refrigerant vessels, ships and boats •••• Puttina it another way; a quality product is a safe product, a quality maintenance system is a safe maintenance system (D'Souza et al., 1989, p.Sl) .
Under the heading "Cultural factors" the report continues:
These quality-system principles are only if quality ia part of the culture of the whole fum, from top-management down. Preferably they should be accepted throughout the sector in which the finn operatea, and better adll they should be a feature of the national culture. At tho level of tho firm, for example. it would be futile to try to build a quality product in a slipshod factory. Upservice and buzzwords will not produce quality and aafety .... Here aailn we stress that such values need to be reinforced by the total national environment· they should be evident in the behaviour of manaaera and the leadera of aoclot.J. Such changes cannot be produced overnight. Time and eft-' wiD be requimcl to bring them about (p.51).
Though many may feel that such an approach is not for the average nndorta~DS 1bat
is not so. Quality of product or service should be the aim of every uadertakina
The proposal for an institute to be the technical, scientific and research arm of the commission has faded into obscurity. The efforts of the Health Departtnent to establish adequate technical, scientific and research resources over the last 3 decades have only met with limited success despite the very detet1nined efforts on the part of a small number of very dedicated officials. Regrettably, the events of the recent past have seen a dismembering of most of what remained. The technical support needed by the inspectorate now comes from the Area Health Boards which do not all have the same ability to meet the needs. The recommendations of the Advisory Council for Occupational Health and Safety thus remain but a pipe dream. If the health hazards of the working environment are to be accorded adequate consideration, to say nothing of the safety aspects, then it is essential that the Advisory Council for Occupational Health and Safety recommendations be given the consideration that is their due.
Unfortunately the rather pessimistic forebodings of Mullen (1990, p.141) appear to be warranted.
A final comment
Though the words "worker participation" have received considerable airing of recent years, one could well question whether that emphasis is justified. Should not a much wider view be taken, for clearly all sectors must participate and for that reason it is suggested that a "participatory approach" better describes what is needed.
If regulation is to achieve its full potential, then it is suggested that there must be a considerable change in the approach of many, particularly those in the management team. In the long run, it is their systems that are on trial. If the considerable supportive role, that a participatory regime can play, is to be effective, then the negative factors such as victim-blaming, misapprehensions about causation and a sceptical if not an antagonistic view of the value of committees and workers' representatives need to be completely eliminated. One could well question whether the new government has been influenced by the less progressive elements of the employer ranks for their spokesman to indicate that they would "make unrecognisable," the far from revolutionary bill that was presented to Parliament in 1990. If those attitudes and influences are to remain unchanged and persist, then improvement in the occupational health and safety field so many have been seeking will remain but a dream.
However with management recognising the pivotal role of the system, and with greater use of quality control methods, the way will be open for the inspectorate also to be more innovative. They will then be primarily auditors of the undertaking's management of the occupational health and safety policy, rather than mere searchers for non-compliance. Such an approach is always predicated to Dr Ham's edict that the true offender must be dealt with bluntly. Nevertheless, in the end, if regulation continues to be viewed as the main or even the ultimate protector of workers' lives, then we will have failed.
